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THE PRESENT MADE FUTURE:
KARL RAHNER'S ESCHATOLOGICAL
DEBT TO HEIDEGGER
Nicholas Adams

It is well-known that Karl Rahner studied with Heidegger, but although
there has been some recent interest in Rahner's eschatology, it is rarely
recognised how substantially Rahner's discussion of the future draws on
Heidegger's earlier writings on time. At the same time, it is increasingly
desirable to show how technical issues in theology bear upon concrete political practice in the public sphere. This article shows the extent of Rahner's
use of Heidegger and explains how Rahner's understanding of the future
relates to concrete questions of ethics and Christian self-understanding.

Eschatology forms a central part of Karl Rahner's mature theology. For
Rahner the future, understood as God's future for humankind, is an integral
part of how Christians describe the present. Rahner partially blurs the temporal boundaries between present and future in order to describe political
issues associated with planning and the relationship between how the kingdom of God is pictured and the political practices that it informs. For this
reason, Rahner's eschatology offers an excellent example of the way a technical discussion in systematic theology informs profoundly practical issues
in the public sphere. This article offers a sketch of what Rahner seems to
have meant by the future together with a demonstration of its connection to
issues of planning and other politically oriented modes of reasoning.
It is worth noting at the outset that one of the commonly encountered
problems in presenting Rahner's work is his practice of referring to secondary sources or direct influences only very rarely. It is thus sometimes
difficult to decide which kinds of debate provide an appropriate context
within which to evaluate his own opinions and judgements. The questions
addressed here are illuminated most clearly when discussed in the context
of the work of Martin Heidegger. Rahner's own view of time, for example,
becomes clearly illuminated when contrasted to what Heidegger says of
the future in his own early work.
Rahner's contribution to questions of eschatology in the 1960s and 1970s
largely turns on the difference between specifically Christian understandings of the future - the future of creation attested in Scripture and in particular forms of worship - and secular approaches, be they loosely pragmatic
or more strictly Marxist.! The main categories which frame Rahner's position are those of "mystery" and the "absolute future" as something constitutive of what it is to be human. Heidegger's influence on Rahner makes an
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engagement with Heidegger's view of the future in Being and Time of 1927
unavoidable. What makes Rahner's relationship to Heidegger particularly
interesting is his reliance on a philosophy which, like Marx's, understood
itself as overtly and uncompromisingly untheologicaU This is perhaps
something of a liability for a theologian who seeks to articulate a distinctly
Christian view, not least because Rahner nowhere explicitly articulates his
disagreements with, or divergences from, Heidegger. Consequently some
of Rahner's work runs the risk of offering only a commentary on the differences between views of the "future" in Heidegger and those in Marx, siding
largely as Rahner does with Heidegger. Unlike the case of the Protestant
theologian Rudolf Bultmann, whose relationship and frequent meetings
with Heidegger are well documented, Rahner's own dependence on
Heidegger is difficult to describe at all confidently: Rahner himself does not
explicitly describe how he uses Heidegger's anti-"metaphysical" philosophical project. Despite these difficulties, and given Heidegger's own problematic and difficult relationship to questions of political practice in the public
sphere, this issue cannot be avoided if one wishes to take seriously the usefulness of Rahner's eschatology for contemporary Christian practice.

Absolute Future and the Extended Present
The task Rahner sets himself in his essay "The Hermeneutics of
Eschatological Assertions" can be given a simple precis: how should statements about the future found in scripture best be understood, particularly
in the light of culturally predominant current understandings of time
which largely describe time as a linear succession of events? His answer
can also be given relatively plainly: eschatological assertions made before
the modem period presuppose a radically different understanding of time,
which incorporate an altogether richer understanding of the freedom and
Grace that must (for Christians) accompany understandings of worldly
causality.3 Drawing upon a largely Heideggerian lexicon, it is Rahner's
intention to challenge what might be called positivist interpretations of
scriptural texts (which exercise a hermeneutic more appropriate to interpreting a weather report) and at the same time demonstrate the kinds of
political responsibility that follow from a deeper understanding of scriptural assertions about God's future.
If eschatological assertions are not like weather reports (or press reports
in advance) how should we best understand them? Rahner distinguishes
between apocalyptic and eschatology:
whenever there is speech [in Christian theology] about the future
whose intended content is the anticipated report of a spectator concerning a coming event, there is a false apocalyptic (Rahner IV, 410
[330)).4

Echoing Kierkegaard's remarks about faith in Fear and Trembling,
Rahner suggests that apocalyptic, wrongly understood, reduces the future
merely to a "distantly outstanding object (abstiindig Ausstiindige)." (IV, 408
[329])5 By contrast
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Eschatology is therefore not an anticipated report of events to follow
later on ... but the necessary forward-looking glance for the person in
his or her spiritual decision in its dual aspects of freedom and faith ....
This looks toward the completion of an already eschatological situation (IV, 414-5 [334]).
Rahner dismisses what he calls "metaphysical doctrine" and privileges
the notion of "decision", which strongly suggests the influence of
Heidegger's earlier work. This deserves some examination, as it will
become clear that Rahner's understanding of eschatology as discourse
about that which is "futurally present (kunftiges Anwesende)" (IV,408 [329])
derives with very little alteration from those sections in Being and Time on
the temporality of Dasein. Such an existential framework for understanding eschatological assertions always presupposes that the "future" presented in biblical accounts exercises a practical claim. Eschatology is thus, for
Rahner, speech about a future which pragmatically shapes human selfunderstanding:
Man holds himself, directs himself, understands himself, in and by
retaining his past anamnetically, and by being prognostically present
to the outstanding future (IV, 411 [331]).
This use of prognosis has almost nothing to do with what has come to
be known as futurology, which presupposes that the human agent is little
more than a spectator (as in meteorology or "balanced" journalism), but
rather insists that the prognostic self is herself unavoidably engaged in a
practical grasp of what is to come. What this might mean will emerge in
the later discussion. In such a realm, the subject has no perspective outside
the temporal chain of events:
knowledge of the future, in so far as it is still outstanding, is an inner
moment of the self-understanding of man in his presence - and it
comes out of it (IV, 411 [331]).
Two important factors follow from this. Firstly, eschatology is better
understood as the "futurity of the present"; secondly this futurity is to some
extent an "incalculable, uncontrollable force," which is to say that it encompasses freedom at a level which confounds the limited self-knowledge of
the individual subject. By the "futurity of the present" Rahner seems to
mean something like this: if someone has a particular self-understanding (as
a Christian, for example) then this implies a participation in a constellation
of social aspirations and roles which help shape concrete judgements, and
these in tum imply a future. A strictly pragmatic version of this insight
might be that a builder's self-understanding, at any stage of construction,
implies having built a house. A more complicated theological version
might be that a Christian's self-understanding, at any stage of cultural formation, implies God's redemption of creation in Christ. The important difference between being a builder and being a Christian is that while a
builder's practical horizons can be articulated quite definitely ("house"), a
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Christian's horizons unavoidably transcend any particular achievement.
This is because the redemption of creation is, from our limited human perspective, indeterminate and unknowable. For this reason, Rahner insists
that a fundamental feature of eschatology is its confrontation of the future's
unassailable "mystery" and its unsayable absoluteness. A Christian
builder, for example, may build a house but her house will never have fully
embodied the redemption of creation, even if it participates in that redemption through being a house in which God is rightly worshipped.
Eschatologically, the future is always part of the present. It is in this light
that one may best understand what Rahner means when he says:
As a Christian, a man knows about his future because he knows (and
so far as he knows) about himself and his redemption in Christ
through God's revelation. His knowledge concerning the eschata is
not a communication additional to dogmatic anthropology and
Christology, but their transposition into the grammatical mood of
completion (IV, 415 [335]).
It is the participative, social nature of eschatology, together with the
future's mysterious and indeterminate freedom, that makes so-called apocalyptic meteorological assertions about the future of creation false. Such false
assertions deny the subject's own roles and responsibilities in the production
of the worldly future and thus" de-eschatologise" him, and make of him "a
being who in his present is not concerned with the future, because the future
is only this distantly outstanding object" (IV, 408 [328-9]). By contrast

biblical eschatology must always be read as a statement coming from
the revealed present and going towards the real future; not as a statement coming from an anticipated future going to the present. To assert (A us-sage) from the present into the future is eschatology; to insert (Ein-sage) from the future into the present is apocalyptic ... The
eschatological statement belongs to man's nature and, when it deals
with the present as revealed by the word of God, is Christian eschatology. The apocalyptic in-sertion is either fantasy or gnosticism...
(IV, 418-9 [337]).6
This distinction between the existential futurity of the present and the
future merely understood as the linear continuation of the present sets the
stage for Rahner's engagement with what he understands as the predominant forms of secular orientations to tl1e future.
The expectation of the future voiced by those Rahner calls "Marxists" is
"a future which is possible, really internal to the world, foreseeable, which
is categorially describable and which can be planned" (VI, 77 [59]).
Although Rahner does not routinely use the term, this might be named the
"determinate future," and it can be compared with the "absolute future,"
an expression found in all of Rahner's essays on the future, and which
means a future which transcends every "worldly and categorisable
future." The word "absolute" refers in this context to that which is unconditioned. By definition the absolute future is finally umeconcilable with

PRESENT MADE FUTURE

195

the determinate future, because the latter refers to that which is bounded,
conditioned and particular. What makes Rahner's account of the absolute
future interesting, however, are the specific ways in which it is not wholly
assimilable to a philosophical framework based on Kant, who was the first
philosopher to use words like "absolute" routinely.
For Kant the idea of that which is unconditioned or absolute arises from
reason's abstraction from all particular conditioning, in particular the limitations of space and time. 7 We come to apprehend objects because of their
boundedness in space and time, and come to acquire an abstract notion of
space and time and can entertain - if only formally - the notion of something that is not bounded in this way, even though such absoluteness cannot in principle be experienced as a thing. Kant moves from here to a view
that the idea of the unconditioned functions for reason as the totality of conditions and thus in some sense the rational "ground" of the conditioned.
The kind of language used by Rahner, by contrast, is of a different kind. s
Christianity ... understands itself, and can be understood, from the
future which it knows as absolute, coming towards humans and
humankind ... the absolute future is the true and real future of man; it
is real possibility for him, an offer which is coming towards him (VI,
78-9 [60-1]).
Whereas, for Kant, an absolute notion is a product of reason, and therefore functions merely as a regulative standard (it must be postulated but it
has no intentionality of its own), Rahner insists that the absolute future has
its own peculiar kind of personal agency and is that with which human
beings can establish some kind of relationship:
The true future, the last thing which is itself un-makable by us, happens quite simply; it comes towards us .... We are those who experience its lightning in the hope that our experience of darkness may
tum out to be a consequence of the future's dazzling brightness, and
that it might not kill us but save us eternally (VIlI, 560 [X, 240]).
This constitutive element of human understanding of the world is not
only the "condition of the possibility of a categorised worldly planning"
but is itself the creator of all futures: "Christianity is the religion of the
absolute future" (VI, 79 [61]). In a particularly bold statement Rahner says
Absolute future is only another name for what is really meant by
"God" ... God, as absolute future, is fundamentally and necessarily
the unsayable mystery ... (VI, 80-81 [62])9
Rahner is careful not to suggest that the absolute future defines or
exhausts what is meant by "God" and this relates to the fact that the term
"absolute future" is itself not exhaustively definable. "God" and "absolute
future" do, however, refer to each other. The reasons for positing this
identification are not explicitly given but there are at least two plausible
possibilities. Firstly, it is important to escape from the Kantian regulative
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framework which would reduce the absolute future to the rationally reconstructed pool of possibilities for all determinate futures. This would exercise no binding claim on human judgements because right from the outset
it is divorced (abstracted) from any particular form of life.lO Secondly, by
identifying the absolute future with God, the stakes are raised in any
encounter with what Rahner calls "Marxist Utopia": any determinate
future cannot be made a final goal, in Rahner's scheme, without explicitly
committing an act of idolatry. Rahner rejects both purely rational theology
(where God is no more than an idea of reason) and the kind of pantheism
where God is identified with, and known as, the substance of the world.
Having asserted unambiguously that no determinate instance of planning can be considered final, and having claimed that Christian worship is
oriented to God's completion of creation, Rahner is clear that the rejection
of "utopian ideology" - which posits "a determinate, single reality of the
pluralistic world of experience as an absolute, fixed point" - does not mean
that one is uninterested in the future in an everyday sense: the tomorrows
of next week and next year. On the contrary: we are confronted with political tasks and responsibilities.
Christianity is not merely neutral with respect to sensible planning of
the kind of future that is internal to the world but adopts a positive
orientation to it. It treats this rational, actively planned construction
of the worldly future ... as a task given with the divinely willed being
(Wesen) of humanity (VI, 83 [64]).
This is an important comment about the limits of theological appeals to
truth. Whilst Christian theological claims, at their most fundamental level
(such as in creeds and doctrines), must remain appropriately agnostic
about "the material content of this future" - that is, our concrete tomorrows
- nevertheless, Christian practices of worship make a fully engaged practical orientation not merely unavoidable but positively demanded. As a
mere theologian, Rahner knows he has no special authority to make infallible pronouncements about the concrete future required of us by God; nevertheless as a responsible Christian he must exercise good judgement
about which instances of concrete planning and practice are most appropriate to a Christian understanding of graced human subjectivity. Before
considering this question further, it will be helpful to gain a clearer idea of
Rahner's relationship to Heidegger's philosophy.

Originary Temporality
The explicit philosophical influences on Rahner's theology are well
known." Detailed evaluation of such influences, however, is made difficult
by the fact that Rahner's own reading habits are not known in detail, and
some of his most important writings do not offer substantial apparatus that
might guide the reader to his sources. Nevertheless, it is illuminating to
compare Rahner's position with Heidegger's classical statements in Being
and Time. In order to take up a perspective on Rahner's appropriation of
Heidegger it is necessary to have a relatively clear view of Heidegger's
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own contribution to philosophical understandings of the future.
Concerning Heidegger's pragmatic or non-pragmatic view of time, opinion
is divided12 The part of Heidegger's early work which bears most directly
upon Rahner's eschatological categories is division two section III of Being
and Time, on the temporality of Dasein, and in particular the authentic
forms that this temporality can and should take. The other major text
which provides useful orientation is Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie,
written in 1927, but as this was only published in 1975, it did not directly
influence the writings by Rahner under consideration here. The key terms
relevant to this discussion are temporality (Zeitlichkeit), resoluteness
(Entschossenheit) and the advancing future (Zu-kunft).
For Heidegger, in conscious opposition to Kant, temporality is not merely a condition for the subject's constitution of objects but is itself a condition for understanding that kind of subjectivity itself;J3 it is the "horizon
from which we understand being."J4 Temporality and its role as an intrinsic aspect of Dasein is most clearly brought into focus in Heidegger's discussion of death and the future. Briefly, for Heidegger, Dasein is rightly
understood as being which orients itself to its own dying in such a way as
to do justice to its finiteness. This kind of orientation Heidegger names
"resoluteness." "Authentic" Dasein (the kind of being to which one should
aspire) thus manifests - and is - a resoluteness in its anticipation of death
(5Z 302 [349-50]).15 Crucial to this kind of statement is an acknowledgement that death is not simply a future event that occurs at the end of life
but is something whose importance is constantly part of present life.
Anticipation brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to
when that possibility will become an impossibility (5Z 308 [356]).
What Dasein has the capacity to be - its "ownmost possibility" - must
entail a confrontation with its own ending, with its own final impossibility
in order that it may correctly understand its own provisionality. Only
Dasein that has grasped its own contingency can avoid deluding itself and
can thus act with a resoluteness that is not a form of escape or a makebelieve "overcoming of death" (5Z 310 [357]). Dasein should thus have a
particular orientation to the future which accepts that its end is coming and
that an appropriate kind of living must integrate this fully into its selfunderstanding. Dasein which has such a self-understanding can then orient itself practically towards its own positive possibility.
Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially ... is
being towards one's ownmost distinctive potentiality-for-being. This
sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards
itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself - in
other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself is that
distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards (Zu-kunft) (5Z 325 [372]).
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There is, in other words, a dimension to Dasein that is "possibility": its
"what it can be" has not yet been realised, but this "what" nevertheless
shapes what Dasein is at any current moment. Dasein's integral future (to
be distinguished from events in its life that are merely yet to occur) is
something that is experienced as an advent of its own possibilities to which
Dasein responds (or fails to respond) in an appropriate fashion.
By the term "futural" (zukiinjtiges), we do not here have in view a
"now" which has not yet become "actual" and which some time will
be for the first time. We have in view the coming (Kunjt) in which
Dasein, in its owrunost potentiality-far-being, comes towards itself.
Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way
that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being,
is always coming towards itself - that is to say, in so far as it is futural
in its being in general (5Z 326 [373]).
The insistent usage of the present tense to characterise Dasein's futurity
is a central feature of Heidegger's strategy to confound a purely linear
view of time. In his discussion of temporality Heidegger says quite plainly
"we must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of 'future,'
'past,' and 'present' which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary
conception of time" (5Z 326 [374]). The kind of futurity that in some way
gives rise to the present is a "primordial," deeper kind of futurity: "we do
not have in mind 'in advance of something' [das 'Vorher'] in the sense of
'not yet now - but later'" because this would just tum Dasein into the kind
of object that is simply observed rather than a being which can understand
itself and anticipate its own comprehended possibilities. Heidegger's
means for evoking this kind of active participation in - and bringing-about
- of Dasein's own future entails a redescription of the kind of temporality
that characterises our subjectivity. He goes so far as to make extreme statements, such as "The primary meaning of existentiality is the future" and "The
primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future" (5Z
327; 329 [376; 378], his emphasis). Hence, although there may well be a
sequence of events which would appear to an observer to make up a history of a particular Dasein, the latter cannot treat events merely as a spectator
but must (or risk inauthenticity) adopt a more synoptic approach where
both past and future are said to form each present.!6 With Olafson, " ...what
Heidegger wants to assert becomes clear in his analysis of the 'moment'
(Augenblick) as the configuration of temporality in which the active character of Dasein is not obscured by a false assimilation to world-time. In the
moment, Dasein does not await the future, but projects it as that which it
has chosen and is acting to bring about."17 Future, past and present can be
said to form an "original unity" which makes Dasein possible, and from
which Dasein takes up its practical responsibilities. 18
With this kind of picture in view it is possible to see why Heidegger
claims, at the beginning of Being and Time, that temporality is so important
as to be "the meaning of" Dasein. If this transformed understanding of temporality, particularly the future, is convincing then it is important to understand what status this Zu-kunjt has vis a vis the kind of future which does
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refer to events yet-to-come. If Dasein is engaged in anticipating its own possibilities, then this will certainly produce concrete events and particular acts
which very much participate in some linear temporal causative succession.
If "the present is just a particular aspect of the act in which Dasein acts
toward a possible future for itself,"!9 that is, if it is part of an original unity
with a practical movement towards particular possibilities, then one must
ask about the ways in which "futurity" is related to possible futures. How
is the existential category" anticipation" manifested in ordinary acts? Even
more simply: is Dasein's "possibility" to be seen as a goal to be realised?
This question can be most clearly set out by considering a debate
between two views of Heidegger. The first is most clearly exemplified by
Mark Okrent. In Okrent's pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger, "possibility" is something made up of things which can in principle be finished.
Temporality is "the structure of Dasein's purposive social activity" towards
a future goal, and Dasein is itself an acting towards a social end; its acting is
"aware of that end as to be accomplished."20 On this model "possible
future" is explicitly equated with what is "to be accomplished." This is
supported by noting Heidegger's borrowing from Husserl of the concept
of "horizon" - temporality is the horizon from which we understand being
- as laid out in the Cartesian Meditations: the horizons of every subjective
process are "predelineated potentialities," and the latter
are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities intentionally predelineated in respect of content ... and in addition, having the character of possibilities actualizable by the Ich. 2!
A horizon is not just the necessary condition for any understanding of
being but also refers to possibilities that can be finished by an act or a series
of acts. In drawing out the implications of this kind of understanding of
horizon, Okrent suggests that there is a "horizon par excellence" or "ultimate horizon" in our consciousness of internal time, and every actual
intentional act is placed within this unlimited context. Intentionality is
thus the situating of an object within a structured horizon which is shaped
socially by what is handed down and what is anticipated: a "concretely
delimited horizon, which is necessary if we are to understand anything
that is as something that is."22
There is a problem with this, however. In speaking of an "ultimate horizon" in which particular realisable possibilities are placed it becomes
extremely complicated to say how such a horizon of all horizons relates to
concretely possible events, other than simply asserting that it is their "condition." Heidegger himself, by contrast, seems to say that temporality is
not only the field within which events take place but is itself an active contributor whose agency derives from Dasein's response to its perceived possibilities. Olafson suggests that there is a question here about the "wholeness" of Dasein, the degree to which it can finish its tasks: "This question
arises out of the account of transcendence as the movement of Dasein
toward its possibilities, its always being 'out ahead of itself' (Sich-vor-wegsein) in such a way that at every moment of its life there is something unresolved and incomplete about it."23 On this view, Dasein's "possibility" is
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never completed until it is finished by death, and concrete realisable possibilities materialise against an ever-receding background of other possibilities. The completion of Dasein is thus something not available (or "presentat-hand") to be inspected or known in advance. It can nevertheless be
comprehended in some less-than-fully-concrete way:
To be sure, I cannot grasp just what my complete identity will be. But
I nevertheless know, even from within my own standpoint, how to
view my life as something I have the potential to realize. 24
It is this kind of "how" of Dasein's orientation to its ending that "anticipation" describes, for Heidegger. The "how" of its outlook can embrace, in
principle, an unlimited number of possible "whats" (concrete realisations of
particular possibilities), and this may be a helpful way of understanding the
relationship between Dasein's "ownmost possibility" and its realisable goals
- no particular one of which can be equated with that existential possibility
itself. "Possibility" as an existential category is perhaps best understood
precisely as the "how" that fundamentally shapes each finite act ventured
by Dasein. It follows from this that giving concrete content (a "what") to the
orientational "how" will always be a matter of judgement which, with varied success, does justice to Dasein's perceived possibility; which is more or
less "authentic" in Heidegger's terms. For Heidegger, the desired "how" is
an attitude of resolute anticipation of Dasein's ownmost possibility in the
face of death in every decisive "moment." Death, which completes Dasein,
is itself a possibility that can materialise at any moment: it is a "constant
threat" (SZ 265 [310]) to which there corresponds a demand that Dasein live
up to its wholeness and authenticity (SZ 269 [314]). The practical "how"
which results from Dasein's understanding of its possibility is thus a
response to an address. Heidegger does not spell out in any simple fashion
how he can know what such an address demands, but it is at least clear that
he believes Dasein experiences its possibility as that which exercises a claim
or a call. Authenticity is thus, for Heidegger, unquestionably binding for
Dasein, although presumably the specific forms which such a claim might
take are subject to the interpretive judgement of Dasein - something that
seems to be overlooked in some of Heidegger's more positive assertions,
where distinctly questionable forms of content are marshalled to fill the formal space of "authenticity" or "possibility."25
If, in Heidegger's wider scheme, understanding an object is competence
in deploying it in accordance with its appropriate role in some context (e.g.
understanding a hammer is competence to use it as a hammer) then the
self-understanding of Dasein is, accordingly, competence with oneself. That
is, self-understanding entails deploying oneself in accordance with one's
appropriate role. For Heidegger, the future of originary temporality is what
William Blattner calls "the sense of" this self-competence.2h Given the equation of "future" with "ownmost possibility" it seems proper to consider the
latter as a "sense of" something. Dasein's "ownmost possibility" is its sense
of its roles and responsibilities in its particular context. If this is placed next
to an understanding that the only completion of Dasein is death, then it
makes less sense to think of "possibility" as Dasein's striving to realise its
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ends than to think of it as a more formally existential orientation.
The second view of Heidegger is best seen in Blattner's interpretation.
Blattner proposes a detailed reading of Heidegger's following statements:
"The future is not later than been-ness" (5Z 350, Blattner's translation) and
"Future" does not here mean a Now, which not yet having become
"actual," sometime will be, but rather the coming, in which Dasein
comes towards itself in its ownmost ability-to-be (5Z 325, Blattner's
translation).
Blattner objects to the pragmatic readings of Olafson and Okrent on the
grounds that they rely too heavily on a notion of Dasein's self-competence
as an ability to realise - that is, complete - its own possibilities; in Okrent's
words Dasein's social role is something "to be accomplished." Blattner
notes that for this to be true, the "future" of Dasein must, in contradiction
to the Heidegger quoted above, be "later than" been-ness.
Moreover, all talk of trying to realize my ends ... seems to imply that
I can actualize or realize myself by bringing myself (or my future
states) about in the future. Yet Heidegger says that this future that I
am as coming towards myself is not something that could be actuap7
The implication of this is drawn out so as to discourage any interpretation which moves too quickly from the formal futural "how" or "sense of"
(Hoffman and Blattner respectively) to the "what" or the "realisable possibility" that Dasein may judge to be an appropriate goal for action. Blattner
uses the example of one's orientation to a particular career as an example:
The sense of "possibility" on which Heidegger relies is not that of
"possible actuality," for it can never (come to) be that I have (already)
made myself a lawyer, for example. The point is not that there are
conditions on being a lawyer that no one can ever satisfy ... The point
is rather that adopting a role (casting oneself in it) is not attempting
to bring about some possible, future state of myself. Casting myself
as a lawyer does not terminate in accomplishment or failure, because
it does not terminate. 28
In order to be a lawyer, therefore, one needs to do something rather
deeper than simply pass law exams and take up a practice. "Casting oneself in a role" is not something achieved and inserted on a curriculum vitae
but something continually ongoing. Roles, in Blattner's sense, are thus
quite different from physical features such as height or hair colour. A
hammer's being "for hammering" is different from its being made of
wood, and being "for hammering" is its future, so to speak. The fact that a
hammer has been used for hammering does not "complete" its being "for
hammering," although it is an appropriate use, given its assigned role.
Dasein differs from a hammer in so far as it understands its being for a role,
and thus takes up an active futural orientation. It is because of this that
Blattner makes the initially odd-sounding claim that Dasein's possibility is
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not something that it can have achieved (which makes it sound distinctly
impossible). Dasein's possibility is achieved in being that possibility, never in
having been it. This kind of convergence of past, future and present makes
better sense of the "original unity" that Heidegger ascribes to them. Thus
one can say that taking a role is an understanding of one's fuhue, a future
that is only completed in death:
There is a sense of potency, ability, of "not yet," that characterizes
Dasein, but that cannot be cashed out by saying that Dasein can or is
able to become, or that Dasein is not yet, but will be later. Thus
Heidegger says, "The "ahead" ['Vor'] does not mean the 'in advance'
['Vorher'] in the sense of the 'Not-yet-now - but later' ['Noch-nichtjetzt - aber spiiter']". 29
It is important not to underemphasise that the "present" of such a practical self-understanding does not denigrate concrete goals (the goals appropriate to being a lawyer, for example) but at the same time the meaning of
the future of originary temporality is not best interpreted as being primarily concerned with bringing about such goals. Particular goals are inseparable from roles, but futurity and "ownmost possibility" refer first and foremost to the roles themselves: the "how" and the "sense of" Dasein's practical orientations to its future. With this in mind one can read Rahner's
eschatological notions with a better sense of their relationship to
Heidegger's description of Dasein's temporality.

Rahner after Heidegger
Given the clear ways in which Heidegger's understanding of time bears
upon the earlier discussion of Rahner's "absolute future," it will not be necessary to rehearse in detail how his various borrowings can be traced back
to their Heideggerian sources.30 Two characteristic examples of Rahner's
whole approach clearly demonstrate how thoroughly he has assimilated
much of the foregoing:
if the present of man's Dasein is what is referred to the future, the latter, remaining the future as such, is not merely something articulated
in advance but is an inner moment of man and of his actual present
in his being ... (IV, 411 [331]).
A human being (and humanity) is the reality which knowingly and
willingly is always before itself, which constitutes itself by devising
its future, or better by devising itself (i.e. its being) towards that future
(VI, 79 [61]).
There are many other such overtly Heideggerian passages in Rahner's
work, such as those in which he speaks of the future as something one
"lays hold of" or as an "inner moment of human existence." Of rather
greater interest are the ways in which Rahner diverges from Heidegger
and incorporates other perspectives into his notion of eschatology.
Importantly, while the concept of the futurity of humanity derives from
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Heidegger, the idea of the "absolute future" was developed in dialogue
with Marxists who (in Rahner's view) placed too great an emphasis on
achievable planned events serially "in the future."31 Unlike Heidegger,
whose articulation of Dasein's "resoluteness" seeks to evade the temporal
series almost completely, Rahner's own response attempts to do more
explicit justice both to an existential futurity (a Christian participation in
redemption) and to show that this must include all political planning
(which without doubt needs a very firm grasp of "ordinary time") which
affirms responsible action in the public sphere but refuses to allow any particular goal to claim to have achieved any final completion. Thus, where
(at least in Blattner's interpretation) the Heidegger of part II of Being and
Time is more interested in roles than in concrete possibilities, Rahner seems
to want to keep these two themes together, so that Christian self-understanding is inseparable from serious questions of political planning (VI, 82
[64]; VIII, 556 [X, 236]; IX, 529 [XII, 191]).32 It may also be significant that
where Heidegger speaks of Dasein, Rahner talks of Mensch, thus shifting a
model of the significant sphere of subjectivity (the "who" in acts of thinking, speaking and doing) towards a more obviously social agent. Dasein
certainly understands itself in a social situation in Heidegger's work indeed, Dasein is remarkable for just such a social network of roles - but
the major existential decisions, calls of conscience and confrontations with
death seem largely to be directed at the individual. Dasein does not seem,
in Being and Time, to have a plural reference in as strong a way as "humanity" or "we Marxists" does. To the extent that Rahner's eschatology
embraces a more collective self-understanding, his thinking is better suited
than Heidegger's to considering directly political questions that require the
co-ordination of different bodies in the discharging of shared tasks. 33
The one quite distinctive characteristic of Rahner's eschatology that constitutes an important contribution to speech about the future is the insistence that the future is utter mystery (IV, 408ff. [329ff.]; VI, 80ff. [62ff.]; VIII,
555ff. [X, 235f£.]; IX, 526 [XII, 188ff.]).34 The theologian's task is not to unveil
that mystery through some privileged futurological or quasi-meteorological activity but rather to articulate the ways in which humans might rightly
respond to it in particular times and places:
.. .it must obviously be said that humans can and must plan the
future, project and draft it in advance and manipulate it ... But this
does not change the fact that even the question of the worldly future,
fundamentally, cannot ever be adequately answered (IX, 529 [XII,
191-2]).
There is, for Rahner, no way of evading the mystery of the future. In
part, this is important in order to give due weight to issues of freedom:
If there is any real freedom ... then there is an open and dark worldly
future which illuminates itself fundamentally for the historical subject in the act in which it is posited and so is made present (IX, 535
[XII, 197]).

204

Faith and Philosophy

This is a relatively simple point whlch denies any kind of hlstorical
determinism, the so-called Hegelian legacy in Marxist hlstorical materialism which is over-confident about its predictions. At the same time
Rahner draws attention to the contingency of all human action:
The future is not evolutionary, not planned, not at our disposal... The
future silently lies in wait and springs out at us, tears up the nets of
our plans, spoils the kind of "future" which we ourselves have
planned ... (VIII,556 [X, 237]).
This is not merely a banal reminder about the vulnerability of the best
laid plans. Rahner here links the mystery of the future - whlch at one level
refers to its unpredictability - to the claim that it makes, to the fact that
futurity is part of what human being entails, and that an attitude to the
future partly constitutes who we are. In other words, an inner constitutive
aspect of being human is itself underdetermined and in principle unknowable. Every act of particular goal-oriented calculation must incorporate the
absolutely incalculable: or risk being blind to issues that make any kind of
practice meaningful:
before the future alone can we pose the questions we answer to ourselves; as the empowering of our free power - whlch can only bring
about determinate things in the realm of what it has not itself
brought about - it already stands open, and we can begin with it
(VIII, 557 [X, 238]).
Rahner is here attempting to articulate the wider context within whlch
particular goals - the "worldly future" - are situated. However clearly a
particular course of action may be perceived by the actors who plan to
bring about a determinate conclusion, thls itself rests on a deeper ecology
of conditions over whlch they do not exercise any control, and finally on
what is unconditioned, on what is in principle uncontrollable. 35 At this
point one can summarise Rahner's principal contributions to discourse
about the future.
The "future" is, for Rahner, fundamentally formal: its concrete determinations cannot be specified in advance, either by forms of gnosis or via
determinist schemes of the type that occur in some (unspecified) "Marxist"
writings. The future is an "inner" constitutive aspect of human self-understanding whlch addresses humanity as a collective body and imposes itself
as an unfinishable task. It is thus up to the judgement of individuals and
groups rightly to interpret thls task in such a way as to produce manageable and realisable tasks (the "worldly future") in the public sphere. The
absolute future is inescapably incomprehensible - there is an absolute,
blinding excess of it - but it nevertheless imposes itself as a question to
every particular human action which should, Rahner claims, constitute
some kind of contingent response to that question:
Where Christianity is, at one and the same time, a real will towards
the world and a Yes towards the absolute future - in a relationshlp of
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mutual conditioning - it creatively brings forth something utopian
which criticises the present and continues to push towards a new historical future (IX, 537 [XII, 199]).
This brief half-acknowledgement of Ernst Bloch indicates that the formality of the future is made effective in concrete acts through the mediation of acts of political judgement. The relationship between form and content - a relationship which, according to Rahner, is unavoidably "fluid"
(IV, 425 [345]) - is arrested in particular times and places so as to produce
such critical apparatus as "standards" and "ideals" - which belong to the
realm of the "utopian" (IX, 537 [XII, 198]) - and yet which are always provisional and dependent on the "absolute future."

Questions
There are, however, important questions surrounding Rahner's use of
the word "absolute." If acts of judgement arise from a "mutually conditioning relationship ... between man's relation to his worldly future and his
attitude towards his absolute future" (IX, 536-7 [XII, 198]) then it clearly
matters how this absolute future is characterised. Put simply, if the
absolute future is only mysterious - something excessive, unintelligible then it cannot condition anything in any particular way, just as a merely
determinate future contains no internal criteria for deciding how to change
itself: there is no meaningful way of judging whether one act is better than
another. There are many possible ways to address this state of affairs. One
is to make a fundamental claim about the world so as to give it an internal
criterion (a strategy employed by Ernst Bloch in his The Principle of Hope,
for example); another is to make a claim about the unconditioned (for
Rahner, the "absolute future') by connecting it to God. 36 "God," of course,
however mysterious, is understood by Rahner, as a Christian, in a partinllar way and, for him, speech about God has the capacity both to inspire
and discipline the imagination. In order to give some content to the ruthlessly formal structure of the "absolute future" - in order for it to be at all
meaningful - Rahner insists that the theologian's ignorance of future
events (a quite normal human ignorance) is an advantage because her task
is precisely to remind others that this ignorance is inescapable (IX, 519 [XII,
181]). Having done this, the real question must centre upon the orientation
which one takes up towards this unknown future; Rahner is quite clear
that, because one cannot fruitfully enquire into the content of the future,
one's ignorance needs to become docta ignorantia - an ignorance that is educated in some way.37 As a Christian theologian, Rahner associates this education with revelation:
Christian faith ... confesses that this absolute future of the world is
not only offered as merely open possibility, but is infallibly and victoriously confirmed in Jesus Christ (IX, 520 [XII, 182]).
In other words, the content of the formal entity" absolute future" is not
given internally: any uneducated encounter with it is experienced as a
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threatening mystery which rejects all attempts to comprehend it. This
much is shared with Heidegger who affirms that however much Dasein
may corne to understand itself, Sein remains threateningly unknowable.
Both Rahner and Heidegger seem to be in agreement about the extent to
which philosophy can provide answers at the level of being itself. Unlike
Heidegger, however, Rahner does not make death the decisive event for
human life. He controls, and to a certain extent abolishes, this agnosticism
through Christology. In so doing, by understanding being, or the absolute
future, in a particular way, Rahner is no longer engaged in a narrowly
philosophical pursuit, not even a speculative one. When Rahner states
confidently that the future is where one looks, in hopeful expectation, Hfor
the love of God and of man" he is no longer engaged in the same type or
level of discourse as that which conducts an analysis of the futural dimension of human self-understanding. The latter is a form of phenomenology,
an exposition of what is in principle accessible, allegedly, to any enquirer
who chooses to ask questions about how humans can be understood to
have an orientation to the future. The following assertion is clearly of a different kind:
the absolute future is God himself, or rather the deed of his absolute selfcommunication, accomplished by himself alone (IX, 523 [XII, 185]).
No degree of phenomenological analysis could yield this kind of statement: it is a claim whose force derives from a context and a language in
which the reader must already have learned to participate. In sum:
Rahner's theology "includes" philosophical analysis, rather than being
derived from it.
It is important to note that any particular characterisation of the absolute
future is not just a "standard" by which the outcome is measured because it has no concrete content that would be commensurate with the
decision in question. Rather, as with Heidegger's portrait of futurity, its
character is a constitutive part of the self-understandings of the participants in discussion, and shapes their aspirations, although it cannot determine them in any direct way, again because it is formal. What it certainly
is not is an idealised determinate future which all real futures try to establish as nearly as possible. The redemption of creation (to take one exampIe) is not something of which one can have a concrete blueprint, and
which one can then attempt to approximate in individual instances. It is
not attainable as a determinate future and, more importantly perhaps, is
not even partially or "more or less" attainable as a determinate future. A
better approach is to say that a determinate future is, to a greater or lesser
degree, consonant with the demands made by the absolute future, and
judgements made in the light of it may be more or less sound. By contrast,
the absolute future itself is unconditioned and makes a claim which cannot
be finally captured by any particular image, although particular images
(which themselves can only arise through acts of judgement) certainly indicate the nature of its claim in a particular circumstance. Particular human
decisions should not anticipate achieving the absolute future, and particular human ideas about what the absolute future would be like should not
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claim final validity. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that an orientation
to the absolute future is possible so long as it has particular formal qualities
and not others. These formal qualities are to be understood as given, by
and large, in the structures of a community's particular self-understandings, practices and language. While they can be abbreviated and made the
object of debate they are nevertheless best understood as something
received, or already part of the social world, rather than consciously produced. The absolute future thus derives part of its authority through
speech about it being handed down, which thus implies that it is inherently bound up with tradition.
This interpretation of Rahner is not unassailable, by any means. Whilst I
think that an emphasis of the" already" operative nature of theological presuppositions to the absolute future (already operative in a particular language and form of practice) does best justice to Rahner's differences from
Heidegger, it would not be implausible to argue (as Fergus Kerr has) that
Rahner tries to ground his fundamental claims by developing an apologetic epistemology.38 Whichever of these positions one adopts, it is true
that Rahner is unclear about what he takes to be the degree to which
human knowledge of God seems to be culturally contingent. Rahner's
belief that all human knowledge and judgement is "universally" conditioned by God's grace needs to be matched by an acknowledgement that
there is no internal validation of such a belief, and that it seems impossible
to imagine the limits of such conditioning. To say that all human action is
a participation in God's creative love, as Rahner does, is to reveal and articulate an ontology whose scope and validity is already taken for granted,
which cannot be externally validated or judged. With this in mind, it is
perhaps trivially true to say that Rahner's connection of absolute future
with God is a consequence of such an imaginative Christian worldview
and cannot be demonstrated independently. Such a suggestion is, at any
rate, probably the only one that will enable a fruitful ongoing engagement
with Rahner's eschatology.
This discussion began with a promise to explore how technically formal
theological issues bear upon concrete political practice. This turns out to
be remarkably simple. Eschatology does not provide Christians with the
concrete content of their political projects but makes explicit who they take
themselves to be and reveals their future, to which they are already, as
Christians, committed. Adapting Heidegger, Rahner asserts that eschatology is a way of speaking that makes explicit the assumptions and roles
implicit in casting oneself as a Christian. For Rahner, Christians understand their roles and responsibilities to be a consequence of their participation in God's own life. Political judgements have to be made (Rahner's
"innerweltlich" domain) in the light of this understanding, which is the context of the absolute future. For Rahner, eschatology is the kind of speech
which explores the nature of the absolute future, which is itself our own
"given" inner self-understanding which we experience as our "futurity."
Eschatology provides the intellectual and imaginative resources with
which responsible Christians make judgements in those public spheres of
politics which concern themselves with the future, above all in political
planning. "Marxism" serves for Rahner as an umbrella for any kind of
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political planning which makes any specific concrete goal into something
"absolute." By contrast with such approaches, Christian eschatology, and
thus Christian political practice, always places its particular plans and
goals within the context of an excessive, absolute future which both makes
possible and judges any particular futures we may try to bring about. In
brief, God is not a human project, and neither is God's future. What God's
future entails for us, and demands from us, is responsible judgement and
decision-making, for which eschatology provides both resources and hope.
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